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Abstract
We analyze a game with N farmers that extract groundwater from a com-
mon aquifer of small storage capacity. Our aim is to compare the socially
optimal, myopic and feedback extraction strategies, the latter arising from
competitive interaction between extracting agents. Our extension to existing
literature is that we consider heterogeneous farmers, facing uncertainty de-
riving from stochastic rainfall. The farmers di¤er in terms of their choice of
irrigation technology, which results in di¤erent farmer-specic impact on the
aquifer recharge rate. We illustrate the implications of the di¤erent strate-
1
2gies on extraction rates, groundwater table levels and welfare attained, via
simulations based on data from the Kiti aquifer in Cyprus.
Keywords: common property resources, groundwater management, dif-
ference games, strategic externality
JEL classication: D62, D99, Q15, Q25
1 Introduction
The most popular behavioral model in the groundwater literature is one in which
farmers execute myopic pumping decisions; that is, the state equation does not enter
the farmers decision problem. Moreover, a large part of the literature focuses on
comparing the steady-state groundwater level under myopic behavior (uncontrolled
non-strategic interaction) and optimal control. See, for instance, Gisser and Sanchez
(1980), Feinerman and Knapp (1983), Llop and Howitt (1983), Allen and Gisser
(1984), Nieswiadomy (1985), Worthington et al. (1985). This focus derives from the
need to explain the paradoxical Gisser-Sanchez (1980) result stating that although
serious depletion of aquifers is a major threat to many freshwater ecosystems all
over the world, the benets from managing groundwater extraction that have been
derived in empirical studies are numerically insignicant.
Koundouri (2000) shows that the Gisser-Sanchez result does not hold in an
aquifer with small storage capacity. Moreover, in these aquifers, myopic ground-
water pumping is not a good approximation of behavior, as externality e¤ects are
3more noticeable. Dixon (1989), Negri (1989), and Provencher and Burt (1993) model
uncontrolled strategic interaction (feedback solution) under the common property
arrangement. In these models farmersbehavior is memorylessin the sense that
each farmers pumping behavior depends only on the current state of nature, and
farmers take the state-dependent extraction rules1 of their rivals as given. The
empirical results from this literature indicate that the steady-state groundwater re-
serves attained when farms use feedback strategies are bounded from below by the
steady-state arising when farms are myopic and from above by the steady-state
arising from optimal exploitation.
Although there exist groundwater studies that take rainfall stochasticity into
account (Burt, 1964, 1967, 1970; Provencher and Burt, 1994; Knapp and Olson,
1995, Fisher and Rubio, 1997; Zeitouni, 2004), non of them is solved in a game
theoretic framework. Whats more, none of these studies consider heterogeneous
farmers. In our paper we consider a model that accommodates both strategic inter-
action between extracting agents and stochastic aquifer recharge, where recharges
stochasticity derives from stochastic rainfall. Each farmer makes his/her extraction
choice facing uncertainty due to stochastic rainfall. Moreover, we consider hetero-
geneous farmers with respect to their choice of irrigation technology, which results
in di¤erent farmer-specic impact on the aquifer recharge rate. The more e¢ cient
the chosen irrigation technology the smaller the return ow of water in the aquifer,
but it is also true that the more e¢ cient the farmer the less water he will extract
from the aquifer for irrigation purposes.
The objective of this study is to compare the socially optimal extraction strat-
4egy with the feedback extraction solution and the myopic solution, when farmers
are heterogeneous and interact under uncertainty deriving from stochastic rainfall.
We illustrate the implications of the di¤erent strategies on extraction rates, ground-
water table levels and attained welfare, via simulations based on data from the Kiti
aquifer in Cyprus, which is an aquifer of small storage capacity. The results support
Koundouris (2000) nding that the Gisser-Sanchez result does not apply to small
aquifers: our results indicate signicant di¤erences between the solutions arising
from competition versus optimal extraction.
The chapter is structures as follows: In section 1 we develop the model of ground-
water extraction with heterogeneous agents under stochastic recharge and solve the
non-cooperative and social planner problems. In section 2 we apply both of these
solutions, via simulation, on data from the Kiti aquifer in Cyprus and discuss the
results. Section 3 concludes the paper.
1.1 Groundwater extraction under non-cooperation
We rst examine non-cooperative extraction of groundwater, where each farmer
makes her extraction decision without considering its e¤ect on the other farmers
expected payo¤s. There are no negotiations or understandings between the farmers.
Each farmer maximizes her expected payo¤, taking as given the other farmersrates
of extraction, which she can only infer from her knowledge of the other farmers
objective functions. Consider an aquifer where only the N farms with land overlying
the aquifer have access to the resource. The farmers di¤er in terms of their choice
of irrigation technology. By assumption, the farmers can be divided into two groups
5according to their e¢ ciency and hence their e¤ect on aquifer recharge rate: e¢ cient
farmers and ine¢ cient farmers. Within each group, farms are identical in the sense
that the prot function (qj;t) representing the benets from groundwater extraction
and the recharge rate k are identical for all the Nk, k = e; i, farmers in the group.
The term qj;t denotes groundwater extraction by farmer j in period t, and the
subscript k = e; i refers to e¢ cient and ine¢ cient farmers. The per unit cost of
groundwater pumping is determined by the level of the water table in period t, ht.
The costs of groundwater extraction, c(ht), then are identical for all the N farms.
Farmer j0s (j = 1; :::; N) net revenue from water consumption is:
k(qj;t)  c(ht)qj;t (1)
By the assumption of farmers within each group being identical, the Nk farms in
each group will pump the same amount of groundwater in period t;denoted by qet
and qit;respectively for e¢ cient and ine¢ cient farmers. Total groundwater extraction
in period t is then given by Neqet +Niq
i
t. The state of the groundwater stock evolves
according to:
ht+1 = g(ht; eRt; qet;qit) = ht + 1AS [ eRt + (ae   1)N eqet + (ai   1)N iqit] (2)
where eRt denotes periodic rainfall, A the area of the aquifer, S the storativity
coe¢ cient, and ak, k = e; i the recharge rate. The annual rainfall is a random
variable. By assumption, the farmersplanning horizon is innite. The discount
factor used to trade o¤ current and future net benets is , where 0 <  < 1:
6There are two hypotheses we might entertain about the farmsdecision problem
when the aquifer is common property. If the agents are myopic, they do not consider
the e¤ect of their extraction on the groundwater stock. Each farm sets its extraction
rate so as to balance the marginal net benet of groundwater extraction and the
unit cost of extraction:
0k(qj;t)  c(ht) = 0; k = e; i (3)
When the number of extracting agents is relatively small, a more realistic description
of pumping behavior would be that each agent considers the e¤ect of its actions on
the groundwater stock, but takes the other agents extraction plans as given. An
individual agents perception of the stock equation is:
ht+1 = g(ht; eRt; qet;qit) = ht+ 1AS [ eRt+(ae 1)[(N e 1)qet +qej;t]+(ae 1)N iqit ] (4a)
when agent j is of the e¢ cient type, and
ht+1 = g(ht; eRt; qet;qit) = ht+ 1AS [ eRt+(ae 1)N eqet +(ai 1)[(N i 1)qit +qij;t] (4b)
when agent j is ine¢ cient.
The individual agents problem then is to:
max
qj
E[
1X
t=0
tfk(qj;t)  c(ht)qj;tg] (5)
subject to the state equation (4a)/(4b). The dynamic programming equation for
7the agents problem is:
Vk(h) = max
qj
n
k(qj)  c(h)qj + E
h
Vk

g
h
h; eR; qe ; qi ; qjiio (6)
The rst-order necessary condition to the problem on the right side of (6) is:
0k(qj)  c(h) + E

ak   1
AS
V 0k

g
h
h; eR; qe ; qi ; qji (7)
Benveniste and Scheinkmans formula (1979) implies that
V 0k(h) =  c0(h)qj + E
h
V 0k

g
h
h; eR; qe ; qi ; qjii (8)
since @g=@h = 1. Equations (7) and (8) jointly determine the individually optimal
rate of extraction qk

, for k = e; i, given the water table ht and the distribution
of the level of the water table under the individually optimal feedback extraction
policy. The term V 0k(g(:)) represents the private shadow value of in situ groundwater,
available in the next period. It depicts the agents private user cost of pumping
groundwater: each unit of groundwater extracted in the current period reduces the
groundwater stock available for future consumption. An individual agent sets the
marginal benet of an additional unit of water extracted this year equal to the
private user cost in terms of a reduced reserve of water available in the following
year.
81.2 Social planners solution
We next turn to the problem of central (optimal) control. Consider the case where
there exists a single manager with the authority to control each rms rate of ex-
traction. The social planners problem is to maximize the aggregate net benet of
groundwater extraction:
max
qet ;q
i
t
E
1X
t=0
t[N e fe(qet )  c(ht)qet g+N ifi(qit)  c(ht)qitg] (9)
subject to the state equation:
ht+1 = g(ht; eRt; qet ; qit) = ht + 1AS h eRt + (ae   1)N eqet + (ai   1)N iqiti (10)
There are N e e¢ cient agents and N i ine¢ cient agents among a total of N agents.
Assuming that the social planner weighs each farmers net benets equally, the
dynamic programming equation for the social planners problem can be written as:
N eVe(h) +N
iVi(h) = max
qe;qi
fN e[e(qe)  c(h)qe] +N i

i(q
i)  c(h)qi
+ E[N eVe(g[h; eR; qe; qi] +N iVi(g[h; eR; qe; qi])]g (11)
The rst-order conditions are:
Nkf0k(qk)  c(h)g+ E
Nk(ak   1)
AS
[N eV 0e (g[h; eR; )qe; qi]) +N iV 0i (g[h; eR; qe; qi])] = 0
(12)
9for k = e; i. Dividing by Nk yields:
0k(q)  c(h) + E
(ak   1)
AS
[N eV 0e (g[h; eR; qe; qi]) +N iV 0i (g[h; eR; qe; qi])] = 0 (13)
for k = e; i.
Equation (13) together with the associated Benveniste and Scheinkman formula
determines the socially optimal rates of extraction qk

for k = e; i given the water
table ht and the distribution of the level of the water table under the socially optimal
extraction policy. As in (8), V 0k(g (:)) represents the private shadow value of water
left in the ground. In the social planners solution, each farms extraction rate is set
to balance the marginal benet of pumping in the current period to the opportunity
cost it imposes on all agents in terms of a smaller reserve of water in the next
period. A comparison of (7) and (13) shows that the individually optimal rate of
groundwater pumping exceeds the socially optimal rate.
2 Application of the model
The application of the model uses data from the Kiti agricultural region, an aquifer
with small storage capacity located in the coastal southern part of the semi-arid is-
land of Cyprus. The notion of common property characterizes ownership of ground-
water reserves, as the doctrine of absolute land ownership governs property law in
the island. In particular, although the doctrine conditions ownership of groundwa-
ter on ownership of land overlying the aquifer (thereby limiting access), in all other
respects owners of land own groundwater as a common property resource subject to
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the rule of capture.
2.1 The Data
Table 1 summarizes the hydrologic parameters for the region, supplied by the Water
Development Department of Cyprus.
Table 1: Hydrologic Parameters
Parameter Description Parameter Value
ae Return ow coe¢ cient of e¢ cient farmers 0.1000 pure number
ai Return ow coe¢ cient of ine¢ cient farmers 0.4000 pure number
A Area of the aquifer 12 000 000 m2
S Storativity coe¢ cient 0.1250 pure number
eR Rainfall eR s  (20.5, 24.4)
ho Initial elevation of water table 3.45 m
SL Maximum height of water table 47.5 m
The more e¢ cient the irrigation technology the smaller the return ow of water
in the aquifer. Empirical results on the e¢ ciency of irrigation methods can sum-
marized as follows. Irrigation e¢ ciency for surface methods (basin, border, furrow
irrigation) reaches 60%, for sprinkler irrigation (set systems, travelling guns, con-
tinuous move laterals) reaches 85%, and for localized irrigation (drip, micro-spayer)
can reaches 95%. Most of the water not used by the plant is lost due to deep perco-
lation, while a much lower percentage is lost by evaporation or run-o¤. For the area
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under consideration 12% of the farmers use surface irrigation systems, 8% use sprin-
kler irrigation systems and 80% use localized irrigation.2 For simulation purposes,
farmers that use the two most e¢ cient technologies are grouped into one category
and are called e¢ cient, while the remaining less e¢ cient farmers are grouped in a
second category and are called ine¢ cient. The return ow coe¢ cient for e¢ cient
farmers (ae) is taken to be equal to the average of the return ow of the farmers that
use sprinkler and localized irrigation system

1  (85%+95%
2
) = 0:1

, assuming that
evaporation is approximately equal to zero. The return ow coe¢ cient for ine¢ -
cient farmers (ai) is equal to the return ow of the farmers that use surface methods
[1  60% = 0:4], again assuming that evaporation is approximately equal to zero.
The distribution of stochastic rainfall was estimated using a time series of rainfall
in the Kiti region for the years 1927-2003. The mean of the series is equal to
493:21mm and the standard deviation is 109:67mm: We used the test described by
DAgostino et al. (1990) with the empirical correction developed by Royston (1991)
in order to identify the distribution from which our sample is coming from. This test
indicates that at 98% condence level we cannot reject the hypothesis that rainfall
follows a gamma distribution.
Table 2 summarizes the socio-economic parameters for the region.
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Table 2: Economic Parameters
Parameter Description Parameter Value
N Total Number of farmers 60
N e Number of e¢ cient farmers (85% of N) 51
N i Number of ine¢ cient farmers (15% of N) 9
k1 Cost of pumping per m3 of water per meter of lift 0:3500 euros=m
3
k2 The intercept of the pumping cost equation 0:3672 euros=m
3
g
Absolute value of the slope
of agricultural water demand
9; 500; 000 m3=euros
k The intercept of agricultural water demand 3; 500; 000 m3
 (qj) Benet function for each farmer 2:714qj   0:000014q2j
The discussion in the previous paragraph indicates that 85% of the farmers in
the area are e¢ cient, while 15% of them are ine¢ cient. The total number of farmers
is 60. With regards to the groundwater demand curve we use the one estimated
by Koundouri and Christou (2000). Given the absence of observations over a wide
range of prices, the derived demand for groundwater by farmers was estimated by
linear programming. From this demand curve we derive the individual farmers
demand curve and calculate the benet function for each farmer. The marginal cost
function used in the solution of the system is
c[h(t)] = k2   k1  h(t); k1 > 0 (14)
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The di¤erence (SL h) measures pumping lift, the distance from the water table to
the irrigation surface. This pumping cost function (a specic form of a general cost
function) is very popular in the literature; e.g. Gisser and Mercado (1973), Kim et
al. (1989). Its derivatives have the desirable properties: a positive partial derivative
with respect to (q) and a negative cross-partial derivative between (q) and water
table.
2.2 Simulation results
Simulations were carried out in Matlab 6.0 using the CompEcon Toolbox for Matlab
(see Miranda and Fackler, 2002). CompEcon is a set of Matlab routines developed
by Mario Miranda and Paul Fackler for solving a variety of dynamic problems in
economics. Of particular interest to the problem at hand, the CompEcon routines
for solving continuous time dynamic programming problems lend themselves to an-
alyzing both the social planners problem and the feedback solution to the N agent
groundwater extraction game. The dynamic groundwater extraction model gives
rise to functional equations whose unknowns are entire functions dened on a sub-
set of Euclidean space. In many applications, such functional equations lack known
closed-form solutions and can thus only be solved approximately using computa-
tional methods. Among the numerical functional equation methods, the collocation
method provides a exible, accurate and numerically e¢ cient alternative (see e.g.
Judd 1998, 1992, 1994). The CompEcon Toolbox provides a series of Matlab rou-
tines that perform the essential computations required in applying the collocation
method.
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Table 3 reports the numerical results for the steady state. The ndings conrm
Koundouris (2000) result that in an aquifer of small storage capacity, competitive
extraction results in serious depletion of the aquifer and signicant welfare losses.
In parallel to previous studies, the results indicate that a social planner would con-
serve the resource more than the status quo. Under optimal extraction, the mean
elevation of the water table will approach 41 m, as opposed to the current level of
3.45 m. The feedback solution lies between the myopic solution and socially optimal
extraction. However, as the number of farmers sharing the resource is fairly large,
the feedback solution is close to the myopic one, and there is practically no di¤erence
in expected welfare arising from the two competitive policies. The predictions of the
empirical model are grim in terms of the losses arising from competitive extraction.
Under socially optimal extraction the expected welfare would be close to tenfold
compared to the competitive outcome while the groundwater resource would be re-
served. Compared to competitive extraction, the socially optimal solution allocates
substantially more water to the ine¢ cient relative to the e¢ cient agents.
Table 3: Empirical Results
Policy Extraction ef-
cient farmers,
m3
Extraction in-
e¢ cient farm-
ers, m3
Mean water ta-
ble, m
Expected wel-
fare, e
Myopic 155 300 155 300 2.7 113 100 000
Feedback 115 100 117 500 3.3 113 100 000
Social opti-
mum
98 300 260 400 41 1 071 000 000
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3 Discussion and extensions
We have extended the literature on groundwater extraction to consider the case
of stochastic recharge to the aquifer and heterogenous agents. Our results, based
on empirical data for the Kiti aquifer in Cyprus, indicate that competitive extrac-
tion results in signicant welfare losses: social welfare under competitive extraction
is 90 per cent lower than what could be attained under optimal management of
the resource. Moreover, the groundwater resource is seriously depleted. Our results
challenge the Gisser-Sanchez (1980) result that benets from optimal (central) man-
agement are numerically insignicant. Substantial gains could be achieved through
fully accounting for the e¤ect of current extraction on future benets from the
groundwater resource.
Given that our results indicate signicant di¤erences between the solutions aris-
ing from competition versus optimal extraction, an interesting extension would be
to investigate economic instruments that can be prescribed as remedies for the in-
e¢ ciencies arising in the feedback solution. The remedy usually prescribed by the
economics literature for the ine¢ ciencies arising in common property groundwater
extraction is central (optimal) control by a regulator, who uses taxes or quotas to
obtain the e¢ cient allocation of resource over time. Another instrument considered
to implement the full cooperative outcome is a tradable permit scheme. In the con-
text of groundwater depletion Provencher (1993) and Provencher and Burt (1994)
examined the applicability of the tradable permit scheme in which private shares to
the groundwater stock are established. In their framework, farms are granted an en-
dowment of tradeable permits to the in situ groundwater stock, which they control
16
over time. Each farms bundle of permits represents its private stock of groundwater.
This private stock declines due to groundwater pumping and increases to reect the
farms share of periodic recharge. It also changes in response to the farms activity
in the market for groundwater stock permits, increasing when permits are purchased
and decreasing when permits are sold. As a practical matter, the market price for
permits serves to allocate groundwater over time.
Notes
1An extraction rule expresses the groundwater pumping decision as a function of the observed
groundwater stock
2Information provided by the Cyprus Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and the En-
vionment.
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